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NOTES
THE CURATIVE ACT AND THE PROBATE CODE

Curative acts have long been a source of litigation. Their scope has been
recently considered by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Addison v. Fleenorl
wherein the court, treating Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-23092 as a curative
act, said: "A curative enactment may validate any proceeding which the legislature might have authorized previously, or may make immaterial anything which
it might have omitted in the original act.3 .

.

. The statute in question here is

all-inclusive and creates a conclusive presumption that all notices required by
law have been published for the times and in the manner required by law. That
includes notices which are jurisdictional, that is to say, notices which are essential
in order to constitute due process of law, and in that respect, the statute considered
as a curative act cannot be upheld." The court thereby stated the general rule
as to curative acts. Such acts are generally defined as retrospective laws passed to
cure irregular legal proceedings4 but ineffective to cure omissions or defects in
1. 196 P. (2d) 991 (Wyo. 1948).
2. "Presumption after ten years notices properly published.-In any estate, wherein a
decree of final settlement and distribution is or has been entered by any court of this
State it shall, after ten (10) years from the date of such decree, be conclusively presumed that all notices required by law have been published for the times and in the
manner required by law."
3. Citing State v. Snyder, 30 Wyo. 287, 219 Pac. 735 (1923). See also 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 775-6 (8th ed. 1927), universally cited; Patton, Titles sec. 58 (1938).
4. Patton, op. cit. supra; Web v. Den, 17 How. 576, 15 L. Ed. 35 (U. S. 1854) ; Forster v.
Forster, 129 Mass. 559 (1880) ; Fuller v. Hager, 47 Ore. 242, 83 Pac. 782, 114 Am. St.
Rep. 916 (1905) ; McCullough v. Estes, 20 Ore. 349, 25 Pac. 724 (1891).
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procedure necessary to give the court jurisdiction or to enable the proceedings to
constitute due process of law.5
The notice which is requisite of due process seems generally conceded to be
"reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard."6 The notice is to be
reasonably designed to give notice to persons whose rights are to be affected or,
"fair and just to the parties involved." 7 Where possible, personal service is necessary to constitute due process 8 except that where the proceeding is purely in rem
9
personal notice is not necessary since the proceeding is against propertly only.
The Wyoming Court has said that probate proceedings are of the "nature of pro11
Thus, by giving notice
ceedings in rem" 10 but treat them as strictly "in rem."
by publication the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of
12
determining their rights to any portion of the estate.
In Wyoming, since District Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, their
orders need not recite jurisdictional facts, even in probate proceedings.13 A presumption of regularity applies to such proceedings so that they are not susceptible
14
If,
to collateral attack except for defects showing upon the face of the record.
is
sufservice
and
constructive
regular,
are
presumed
of
probate
all
orders
then,
ficient to give notice and effect jurisdiction of the rights of all the world to any
portion of the estate, wherein might section 6-2309 be unconstitutional? Obviously the failure to give notice must first appear from the face of the record. Second,
there must be a failure to meet the requirements of due process of law.
The action in Addison v. Fleenor15 was for a declaratory judgment as to
merchantable title to property which had been set off as a homestead under the
probate code. The records in the estate did not show that the publication of notice
to creditorsl 6 or the publication of the order to show cause in connection with
setting off the homestead17 had ever been given or published as required by
5. Patton, op. cit. supra; Gregory v. Keenon, 256 Fed. 949 (Ore. 1919) ; Roche v. Waters,
72 Md. 264, 19 At. 535, 7 L. R. A. 533 (Ct. of App. 1890) ; Lamont v. Vinger, 61
Mont. 530, 202 Pac. 769 (1921) ; Richards v. Rote, 68 Pa. 248 (1871).
6. Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S. 40, 46 Sup. Ct. 384, 70 L. Ed. 818 (1926)
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908).
7. ". . . a form of substituted service not adapted to bring home notice to party to be
charged is not due process." In re Bergman's Survivorship, 60 Wyo. 355, 151 P. (2d)
360 (1944) ; Cantor v. Sacha, 18 Del. Ch. 359, 162 At. 73 (1932) ; Naisbitt v. Herrick,
76 Utah 575, 290 Pac. 950 (1930).
8. In re Bergman's Survivorship, supra note 7; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 Sup. Ct.
390, 48 L. Ed. 623 (1904) ; Hunstock v. Estate Development Co., 126 P. (2d) 932 (Dist.
Ct. of App. 1942) ; affirmed 22 Cal. (2d) 205, 138 P. (2d) 1 (1943).
9. Leigh v. Green, supra note 8; Roseman v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 154 Misc. 320, 277
N. Y. Supp. 471 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935) ; In re Bergman's Survivorship, supra note 7.
But see Hunstock v. Estate Development Co., supra note 8.
10. Rice v. Tilton, 14 Wyo. 101, 82 Pac. 477 (1905).
11. Addison v. Fleenor, supra note 1; In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P. (2d) 415
(1936), rehearing denied 60 P. (2d) 360 (1936) ; see In re Bergman's Survivorship,
supra note 7.
12. Roseman v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., supra note 9; In re Lane's Estate, supra note 11,
Rice v. Tilton, supra note 10.
13. In re Lane's Estate, supra note 11; Rice v. Tilton, supra note 10.
14. In re Davis' Estate, 151 Cal. 318, 86 Pac. 183 (1906) ; In re Lane's Estate, supra note
11; Rice v. Tilton, supra note 10.
15. Supra note 1.
16. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1601.
17. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1505.
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statute. The court held that these two notices were not jurisdictional. Since
claims of creditors may be presented before the giving of notice and could be
barred by the general statute of limitations, the provisions of section 6-2309 did
not invade any constitutional rights. The failure to give notice of setting aside
the homestead was determined to be non-jurisdictional by reason of the fact that
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter was acquired by general notice given
in the admission of the will to probate and the appointment of an administrator.
The court adopted the holdings of the Californial8 and Missouril 9 courts that,
"These notices constitute due process of law and are sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to make all the subsequent orders in the proceeding as to which special
additional notice is not required." What notices required by the probate code
would be jurisdictional, in view of this holding which the Wyoming Court
specifically confined to notice to creditors and notice to set aside a homestead?20
The possibilities include the following:
(1) Notice of Probate of Wills and Notice to Heirs and Executor 2l
Although the courts generally say that power to proceed attaches on meeting
the requirements of the statute, including publication of notice, 22 the Wyoming
Court, in Rice v. Tilton23 stated: "It is generally held that an order of the probate
court granting letters testamentary or of administration without statutory notice,
will not make the order void ab initio, but such defect is an irregularity merely,
for which letters may be revoked." 24 In that case, however, notice by publication
was given, and such notice is necessary to the application of Addison v. Fleenor to
subsequent provisions of the statute.25 It is probably a correct statement of the
law, however.2 6 When notice is given, it need be only for 20 days, but that is
sufficient to prevent a denial of due process, since any person interested may at any
time within six months after such probate "contest the same or the validity of the
will." 2 7 Although executors and heirs are entitled to service under the statute,
18. In re Bump's Estate, 152 Cal. 274, 92 Pac. 643 (1907). The court here was considering
a contention that the failure of the statute to require notice was unconstitutional and
not the omission of the notice required by statute. The holding herein applied to the
rights of heirs, devisees, and legatees.

19. First National Bank v. Cook, 74 S. W. (2d) 846 (Mo., Springfield Ct. of App. 1934)
Limb v. Bevins, 236 Mo. App. 556, 155 S. W. (2d) 508 (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1941).
Here also the statute did not require any notice of the admeasurement of the homestead. These Missouri courts applied the rule to creditors.
20. "We are here dealing with notice to creditors and notice to set aside a homestead, and
the decision herein is confined to them."
21. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-208, 6-209.
22. In Matter of Warfield, 22 Cal. 51 (1863) ; In re Lane's Estate, supra note 11.
23. Supra note 10.
24. The cases cited do not directly support the proposition from the viewpoint of notice
and due process. ". . . in the preliminary proceeding for the appointment the res is
the status of the officer." State v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 317 Mo. 1078, 298 S. W. 83
(1927). Cf. Farmers and Merchants National Bank v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. (2d)
842, 155 P. (2d) 823 (1945).
25. ". . . assuming that the will was admitted and the appointment of an administrator
with will annexed was made pursuant to notice previously given, so as to duly initiate
the probate proceedings in the estate. We are basing the decision herein upon that
assumption, ..

."

196 P. (2d) 991, 993 (1948).

26. See the discussion following relative to the granting of letters of administration.
27. Wyo. Comp. St. 1945 sec. 6-408. In re Davis' Estate, supra note 14; Simpson v.
Cornish, 196 Wise. 125, 218 N. W. 193 (1928).

NoTEs
28
the publicaand it is error to proceed without proof of such service as required,
names of
the
set
forth
to
tion of notice being notice to all the world, the failure
a
deprivasuch
the heirs in the petition and failure to serve them personally is not
29
The fact that the hearing
tion of due process as to make the proceeding void.
is not had on the day provided in the notice3O or that the will is not admitted on
the day specified,31 is a mere irregularity and even though no order is made adjourning the proceeding to a later date, no new notice is necessary as there was
32
irregularity occurring after jurisdiction had been acquired.

(2)

Contest of Wills.

33
Citation to Parties Interested.

Although it has been said that the citation is "to give the court jurisdiction of
34
the proceeding is in rem
the parties who would be affected by its revocation,"
and service of the citation is not essential to the jurisdiction of the res and might
have been omitted from the statute. 35 The absence of personal notice, then, although an irregularity 3 6 would not make such a proceeding void. But, is even
constructive notice required? Although the decision of Addison v. Fleenor was
confined to notice to creditors and notice to set aside a homestead, by analogy
thereto, jurisdiction of the proceedings has already been acquired by other notices
and the proceeding could be entertained without any notice whatsoever, leaving
37
the proceeding merely irregular and subject to the operation of the curative act.
The executor has been held to be a necessary party defendant,38 however, and
perhaps the fact that his status is involved, as well as interests in the property,
9
would require notice to him.3
(3)

Appointment of Administrators.4 0

The statute provides for the issuance of letters of administration at a hearing,
28. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-211. Estate of Mary Cobb, 49 Cal. 599 (1875).
29. Murray v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 381, 278 Pac. 1033 (1929), later distinguished in
Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank v..Superior Court, supra note 24, (Where the
name of the error was not shown upon the face of the petition, the error was not apparent upon the face of the judgment, but if the order includes the names of heirs who
have not been notified, the judgment is void upon its face.) ; Roseman v. Fidelity and
Deposit Co., supra note 9; In re Lane's Estate, supra note 11; Rice v. Tilton, supra
note 10.
30. In re Davis' Estate, supra note 14; Curtis v. Underwood, 101 Cal. 661, 36 Pac. 110
(1894).
31. In Matter of Will of Warfield, supra note 22.
32. Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 Pac. 246 (1928) ; In re Devis' Estate, supra note 14.
33. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-409.
34. In re Maescher's Estate, 78 Cal. App. 189, 248 Pac. 537 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1926) ; In
re Logan's Estate, 171 Cal. 357, 153 Pac. 388 (1915) ; Estate of Simmons, 168 Cal. 390,
143 Pac. 697 (1914).
35. In re Maescher's Estate, supra note 34; Estate of Simmons, supra note 34.
36. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-410.
37. But, where notice of probate of one will was given, the court was without jurisdiction
to probate a second will which revoked the first without further notice, although the
contestant could have had himself appointed administrator without further notice.
Williams v. White, 105 S. W. (2d) 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
38. In re Bernheim's Estate, 82 Mont. 198, 266 Pac. 378, 57 A. L. R. 1169 (1928). Necessary parties were defined as "Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy,
but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Personal
jurisdiction was required. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed. 158 (U. S. 1854).
39. See discussion following regarding the removal of an executor or administrator.
40. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-906 to 6-910.
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but makes no provision for giving notice. Such procedure, while probably not
found with frequency, seems acceptable. 4) In such case, however, the notices
presumed to have been given in Addison v. Fleenor not having been made, the
decision of that case would not apply and the subsequent notices required by
statute would seem necessary. 42
(4) Notices Required Before the Revocation of the Letters of an Executor
or Administrator.4.
Although the proceedings are still in rem, it is the status of the officer which
is being adjudicated,44 and it has been held that the probate court had no power
to appoint a special administrator if the executrix of the will had never been
suspended or removed, and an order appointing a special administrator would not
operate as a removal of the executrix if "she has never been cited to appear, nor
did she appear, to show cause why her letters should not be revoked." 45 It is
generally held that a new administrator cannot be appointed without notice of
hearing as required by statute, 46 though no specific decisions upon the requirement
of due process were found.
Proceedings to Collect Assets-Embezzlement.4 7
(5)
The proceedings provided for in this article require personal jurisdiction of
the person to be examined and notice would be essential to due process.
(6) Transfer of Title of Motor Vehicle Without Administration. 48
The notice required in this section, since it is the only notice contemplated in
the transfer and settlement of the decedent's estate would appear to be essential
to due process. It is a moot problem, however, as after ten years few people would
49
find it worthwhile to attempt any recovery of the car.
(7) Sale or Disposition of Property.50
The statutes make no provision for notice before the issuance of an order to
sell personal property, requiring only ten days publication of notice of the sale
before it is made, and this is not always required for the court may order a private
sale. 51 Where real property is to be sold, an order to show cause and accompanying
notice are required. Here there seems to be two distinct lines of thought. The
41. No instance wherein this procedure was contested was found. See note 24 supra and
the statement noted. Also, perhaps there is no question of due process for the statute
affords adequate opportunity to revoke such letters to anyone with a prior right thereto.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-911.
42. Where a party was not served with notice of the proceedings appointing the administrator, ". . . nothing could be done affecting her interests until the provisions of the
" Morris v. Foster, 278 Fed. 321 (App.
law as to notice had been complied with.
D. C. 1922).
43. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-912, 6-1009, 6-1013, 6-1017, 6-1018, 6-1210, 6-1212,
6-1307, 6-1308, 6-1749, 6-2201.
44. Cf. State v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., supra note 24.
45. Schroeder v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 343, 11 Pac. 651 (1886).
46. State v. District Court, 113 Mont. 318, 124 P. (2d) 1010 (1942) ; In re Fellin's Estate,
108 Wash. 626, 185 Pac. 604 (1919) ; see, In re Dietrich's Estate, 39 Wash. 520, 81
Pac. 1061 (1905).
47. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-1402 to 6-1404.
48. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1510.
49. Any creditor should also be estopped by his laches or the statute of limitations.
50. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-1708, 6-1711, 6-1716, 6-1722, 6-1724, 6-1733, 6-1739.
51. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1708.
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first is that the proceeding is not in rem; therefore, by failure to give notice the
court fails to acquire jurisdiction and the sale is void.52 Being void, it could not
be made valid by curative act. 53 In those jurisdictions following the other view
the proceeding is considered as one in rem. 54 In California, although the proceeding has been called in rem, it is in the nature of an action, independent of the
general jurisdiction over the administration of the estate55 and where the statute
provides for the service of notice, the same rule applies as in civil actions. 5 6 Where
the statute was amended to require notice to be given only upon the filing of a
return of sale, that was sufficient to constitute due process.57 In Washington, it
has been held that the court's action in the sale of real estate could not be void for
want of jurisdiction, for upon the appointment and qualification of the administrator, the court acquired jurisdiction for the purposes of administration, and
the legislature having power to dispense with the notice in such a proceeding, the
lack thereof could be cured by curative act.58 A later decision, although admitting
the proceeding to be in rem, and that the probate court had jurisdiction for the
purpose of administration, held that ". . . still, the substantial requirements of
the statute must be complied with," and a curative act was ineffective to cure a
sale by an administrator without notice to minor heirs.59 Title to the real estate
vests in the heirs upon the death of the decedent subject to the provisions of the
probate code, 6 0 and it would seem that it would be just as much subject to the
provisions allowing a sale for the satisfaction of debts as it is for setting over the
homestead, thus, if the proceedings are in rem, the reasoning of Addison v. Fleenor
should apply equally well here. The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that where the property was subject to debts, there were no absolutely vested
rights and the sale was subject to the provisions of a curative act without any
deprivation of due process,61 and there is substantial dicta to support this theory. 62
52. Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Mont. 395, 136 P. (2d) 760 (1943) ; Lamont v.
Vinger, supra note 5; Robinson v. Spittler, 191 Okla. 278, 129 P. (2d) 181 (1942) ;
Stadelman v. Miner, 83 Ore. 348, 155 Pac. 708 (1916), rev'd on other grounds 163
Pac. 585 (1917), appeal dismissed 245 U. S. 636, 38 Sup. Ct. 359, 62 L. Ed. 524.
53. Gregory v. Keenan, 256 Fed. 949 (Ore. 1919) ; Lamont v. Vinger, supra note 5;
Stadelman v. Miner, supra note 52; Browne v. Coleman, 62 Ore. 454, 125 Pac. 278

(1912).

54. Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L. Ed. 283 (U. S. 1844) ; McPherson v.
Cunliff, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 422, 14 Am. Dec. 642 (1824) ; Furth v. U. S. Mortgage
& Trust Company, 13 Wash. 73, 42 Pac. 523 (1895) ; Ball v. Clothier, 34 Wash. 299,
75 Pac. 1099 (1904) ; Campbell v. Drais, 125 Cal. 253, 57 Pac. 994 (1899).
55. Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 Am. Rep. 656 (1875).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Campbell v. Drais, supra note 54; see Pryor v. Downey, supra note 55.
In re Benvenuto's Estate, 183 Cal. 382, 191 Pac. 678 (1920).
Ackerson v. Orchard, 7 Wash. 377, 35 Pac. 605 (1894).
Ball v. Clothier, supra note 54.
Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 7 L. Ed. 542 (U. S. 1829) ; In re Packer's Estate, 125
Cal. 396, 58 Pac. 59 (1899) ; In re Bump's Estate, supra note 18; Swanberg v. National

Surety Co., 86 Mont. 340, 283 Pac. 761 (1930).
61. Wilkinson v. Leland, supra note 60. Also, Sohier v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 483 (1849).
62. "It may be admitted, perhaps, that a general law would be valid which authorized
executors or administrators to obtain orders of sale on ex parte applications; or to
sell real property, for the payment of debts, without notice to the heir, or applicatiin
to any court." Pryor v. Downey, supra note 55 ; A rule ". . . different from the one we
have adopted prevails in every jurisdiction in which a proceeding of this character is
held to be strictly in rem, wherein seizure of the property itself constitutes notice to
all persons interested." Lamont v. Vinger, supra note 5; Stadelman v. Miner, supra
note 52.
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One thing perhaps should be noted, however, as it is particularly applicable
here and to the discussion of distribution and settlement, infra. That is that the
principal case is based primarily upon the principle that a curative act may make
immaterial anything which might have been ommitted in the original enactment
of any statutory proceeding. The court based its determination of the non-jurisdictional character of the notices involved upon the decisions of courts which were
considering statutes that required no notice. One of these, the California Court,
specifically limited its holding to ". . . all subsequent orders in the proceedings,
as to which special additional notice is not required."63 Many of the decisions of
jurisdictions which hold proceedings not to be in rem, emphasize, not whether the
proceeding is in rem or not, but that since the statute requires notice, the giving
of notice is jurisdictional, 64 and even an "in rem" state, Washington, has held
that although the probate court has jurisdiction for the purposes of administration ". . . still, the substantial requirements of the statute must be complied
with."65 The Supreme Court case sustaining the operation of a curative act upon
a sale made without notice applied to an instance where no notice to heirs or
devisees was necessary by the laws of the state. 66 Then, too, although the property is subject to sale in the administration of the estate, it is not subject to sale
without notice to those parties interested.
The provisions of the statutes requiring publication of notice of the time
and place of sale of real property, 67 like the similar publication required for personal property, is not always required, for here, too, the court may order a private
sale. If the sale is part of the probate proceeding and in rem, there is a stronger
argument that the failure to give such notice is not a deprivation of due process,
but a mere irregularity which may be remedied by curative act. At least, the
discussion of the order to show cause should apply equally well here.
After the sale has been made and confirmed, the court may order a resale of
the property if the purchaser neglects or refuses to comply with the terms of the
sale. 68 Notice to the purchaser is required and this notice is distinguishable from
those discussed above. The title to the property has passed upon the confirmation
and therefore would have vested in the purchaser before such an order. Since the
63. In re Bump's Estate, supra note 18.
64. Gregory v. Keenan, supra note 53 ; Robinson v. Spittler, supra note 52; Browne v.
Coleman, supra note 53; see Montgomery v. First Nat'l. Bank, 114 Mont. 395, 136 P.
(2d) 760 (1943) ; and though the legislature might have originally made the shorter
notice sufficient, after sale had been made under notice not sufficiently long to satisfy the
existing statute, it could not provide that the shorter notice would be sufficient, Finlayson v. Peterson, 5 N. D. 587, 67 N. V. 953, 33 L. R. A. 532, 57 Am. St. Rep. 584
(1896). A party could rely upon the statute, that nothing would be done affecting her
interest until the provisions of the law as to notice had been complied with, Morris v.
Foster, supra note 42. Contra, an administrator's sale after only two weeks advertisement instead of the 30 days required by statute was an irregularity which could be
cured. Womack v. McCook Bros. Funeral Home, 194 La. 296, 192 So. 756 (La. App.
1940).
65. Ball v. Clothier, supra note 54. See also Texas Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l. Trust
& Savings Assn., 5 Cal. (2d) 35, 53 P. (2d) 127 (1936); Campbell v. Drais, supra
note 54; Wills v. Pauly, 116 Cal. 575, 48 Pac. 709 (1897).
66. Wilkinson v. Leland, supra note 60.
67. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-1713, 6-1722.
68. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1730.

NOTES
property would no longer be part of the estate of which the court had jurisdiction,
69
the notice would seem essential to due process.
Although the statute provides a three-year statute of limitations as to actions
for the recovery of any estate sold by an executor or administrator,70 such statute
has been held not to apply to void proceedings.71
(8)
Specific Performance, Conveyance of Real Estate. 72
The only notice required to be given upon the presentation of the petition
is to the executor or administrator. Failure to give this notice would not defeat
the jurisdiction of the court to order the completion of the contract. 7 3 Although
personal jurisdiction of the executor or administrator may be necessary to enforce
the order to convey, there would certainly be no difficulty in that respect.
(9)

Accounting. 74

The provisions of the statute for compelling an executor or administrator to
account require personal jurisdiction of such executor or administrator. It is
rather hard to see how the provisions of 6-2309 could be applicable.
(10)

75
Distribution and Settlement.

The notices required by this section of the statute seem specifically to have
been held to be jurisdictional by the Wyoming Court. In In re Curtis' Estate76
the court held that a decree of partial distribution could be attacked upon final
settlement and adopted the holding of the Washington court 7 7 relative to partial
and final settlements, that such an order ". . cannot be binding upon interested
parties who were given no notice of its proposed entry and no opportunity to be
heard relative to the matters contained in it." Such settlements were held void
and subject to collateral attack. They are in rem, however, and no personal notice
is required.78 The California courts have also held a decree of distribution which
was obtained without notice to be void by reason of the absence of the juridiction
69.

"It would seem to be elemental that a court could not by its decree cancel the sale
by which a person acquired property and order the property so acquired to be returned

without giving him an opportunity to be heard." The court was not considering a
judicial sale, but the principle would seem to be the same. Nicholson v. Kingery, 37
Wyo. 299, 261 Pac. 122 (1927).
70. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1747.
71. Campbell v. Drasi, supra note 54; Maxwell v. Goetschius, 11 Vroom. 383, 29 Am. Rep.
242 (Sup. Ct. of N. J. 1878).
72. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1802.
73. A statute giving the probate court jurisdiction to direct completion of such contracts

without any provision for notice did not deny due process of law. Kramer v. Gaskill,

52 N. E. (2d) 674 (Ohio, Ct. of App. 1943). The Wyoming Court in In re Rigby's
Estate, 167 P. (2d) 964 (Wyo. 1946) held that the title to the property passed to the

heirs upon the landowners death intestate and thus they were entitled to fix the purchase price under any contract of sale where such was yet to be fixed. Due process
was not considered, however.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-1905.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-2302, 6-2305, 6-2314, 6-2318.
59 Wyo. 301, 139 P. (2d) 733 (1943).
In re Peterson's Estate, 12 Wash. (2d) 686, 123 P. (2d) 733 (1942) ; In re Krueger's
Estate, 11 Wash. (2d) 380, 119 P. (2d) 312 (1941).

78. Cases cited supra note 77; Mulcahey v. Dow, 131 Cal. 73, 63 Pac. 158 (1900) ; William
Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 Pac. 323 (1897).
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in the court to render it.79 It would seem, however, that the reasoning used in
Addison v. Fleenor would apply equally well here, for this is part of the probate
proceedings over which the court has acquired jurisdiction, 80 and the Curtis
holding is distinguishable in that the narrow holding was only that the decree of
partial distribution was not res judicata when questioned in the proceedings for
final distribution, where no notice of the partial distribution had been given. The
conclusive nature of the decree here involved and the final determination of the
rights of the parties in the property might possibly furnish grounds to refute the
extension of Addison v. Fleenor this far.

(11)

Notice of Petition for Re-opening.81

The notice upon the presentation of this petition would seem to be subject to
the same requirements as those for the original probate or administration of an
estate.
(12)

Probate of Estates of Non-residents. 82

The notice required before the admission in Wyoming of foreign probate
proceedings, as probate of a non-resident's estate, would also seem subject to the
provisions of section 6-2309. If the foreign probate was proper, the heirs would
be concluded thereby, and the creditors also, as to the property in the foreign
jurisdiction. The property of the decedent in this state is a fund for the payment
of the debts due residents of this state 83 and since the creditors could have petitioned for letters of administration 84 the reasoning of the court in Addison v.
Fleenor is equally applicable: the claims could have been presented before the
giving of notice and could be barred by the general statute of limitations, thus the
provisions of 6-2309 do not invade any constitutional rights.
(13)

Proceedings to Determine Heirship to Land.85

The notice required to be given upon the petition for the determination of
86
heirship has been held to be required before the court may acquire jurisdiction.
But, as in previous instances, the court has already acquired jurisdiction of
the property to determine the interests of the parties thereto, and this section
would seem to be of the same effect as the requirement of notice of the petition for
distribution. The Wyoming Court has held that when an applicant for public
land dies before patent is issued, the land constitutes no part of the estate of the
79. In re Parsell's Estate, 190 Cal. 454, 213 Pac. 40 (1923) ; Baker v. Riordan, 65 Cal. 368,
4 Pac. 232 (1884-) ; also In re Porter's Estate, 183 Okla. S11, 83 P. (2d) 541 (1938) ;
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin, 8 Harr. (Del.) 595, 195 Atil. 287 (Del. Super. 1937).
S0. Partial settlements may be ex parte proceedings. In re Krueger's Estate, supra note
77; State v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123 S. W. (2d) 105 (1939).
81. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-2311.
82. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-2328.
83. McCully v. Cooper 114 Cal. 258, 46 Pac. 82 (1896) ; In re Card's Estate, 64 Cal. App.
268, 222 Pac. 145 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1923).
84. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 6-201, 6-915.
85. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-2602.
86. In re Healy's Estate, 6 Cal. Unrep. 780, 66 Pac. 175 (1901). No decision upon due

process and the attack upon the proceedings was direct.
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decedent87 and therefore, the notice required by section 6-260588 would seem
necessary to constitute due process, since the court would have no jurisdiction over
the property.
(14)

Petition to Establish Rights of Survivorship.8 9

The notice required of the petition to establish rights of survivorship is also
necessary to constitute due process. The Wyoming Court has held that such a
proceeding is not a part of the probate proceeding, but a "quasi in rem" action and
that personal notice upon resident adversaries is necessary. 90
The foregoing, then, would seem to be the significance of Addison v. Fleenor
in relation to the probate code. To consider curative acts generally would require
the writing of a treatise as cases can be discovered which curative acts effective
or ineffective upon almost any general fact situation. The general principles upon
which they operate are clear; the particular application is difficult and often conflicting. An attempt has been made to show the application of a curative act to
the probate code as such application is indicated by Addison v. Fleenor and to
indicate those instances wherein the court may vary that application.
Jurisdictional Notice, Required for
Due Process, the Absence of Which
Cannot be Cured:
1. Revocation of letters.
2. Proceedings to collect assets.
3. Transfer of title of motor vehicle
without administration.
4. Notice of order for resale of real
property.
5. Accounting.
6. Proceeding to determine heirship to
public lands where applicant died
before patent issued.
7. Petition to establish rights of survivorship.

Non-jurisdictional Notices, the Absence
of Which Can Be Cured Once General
Notice for the Admission of the Will
to Probate or of the Appointment of an
Administrator Is Given:
1. Notice to creditors.
2. Order to show cause re setting off
the homestead.
3. Contest of wills.
4. Order to show cause re sale of real
property.
5. Petition for specific performance,
conveyance of real estate.
6. Distribution and settlement.
7. Admission of foreign probate proceedings.
8. Proceedings to determine heirship
except as to public lands where no
patent has issued.
Ross D. COPENHAVER

87. Demars v. Hickey, 13 Wyo. 371, 80 Pac. 521 (1905), rehearing denied 81 Pac. 705
(1905).
88. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945. "Procedure when applicant for public land dies before patent
is issued.-"
89. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 6-2715.
90. In re Bergman's Survivorship, supra note 7.

